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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirm the 
Industrial Commission's final decision by holding that: 
A. Section 35-1-90 is no bar to the enforceability of the 
Settlement Agreement? 
B. There was ample evidence to support the judge's 
finding that, as a matter of fact, "the agreement was validly 
executed by the parties as a settlement of a disputed claim, 
including for permanent total disability benefits." Wilburn v. 
Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah App. 1988); 
and 
C. Maximum deference should be given "to the basic facts 
determined by the agency, which will be sustained if there is 
evidence of any substance that can be reasonably regarded as 
supporting the determination made? Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE, RULES AND CASE 
The Statute, Rules and Case Authority relevant to a 
determinative resolution of the present case are: (1) Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974); (2) Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1987); and (3) Wilburn v. 
Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah App. 1988). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case: 
This case arises out of applicant's alleged industrial 
accident and related claim for permanent total disability 
benefits, under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition By The Court Of 
Appeals: 
1. On February 13, 1986, Gilbert R. Wilburn ("Wilburn"), 
filed an application with the Industrial Commission seeking 
permanent total disability benefits from defendants. (R. 43.) 
Defendants answered the application asserting various defenses, 
including the fact that the claim was barred by a previously 
entered Settlement Agreement. (R. 44-45.) 
2. On May 14, 1986, Administrative Law Judge Richard 
Sumsion reviewed Wilburn's application. (R. 49.) On May 28, 
1986, Judge Sumsion issued Tentative Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, finding Wilburn to be permanently 
and totally disabled. (R. 338-345.) 
3. Pursuant to defendants' Motion for Review and Clarifi-
cation (R. 357-371), Judge Sumsion issued Supplemental Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, vacating his prior 
Interim Order of May 28, 1986, and ruling that the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") entered into between the 
parties and approved by the Commission on November 28, 1984, 
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was binding and precluded the applicant from asserting his 
claim for permanent total disability. (R. 372-376.) 
4. Counsel for Wilburn obtained review of the 
Supplemental Order by the full Commission. (R. 377.) 
Memoranda discussing all of the issues raised in this appeal 
were then submitted to the Commission for review. (R. 
380-406.) The Commission denied Wilburn's Motion for Review, 
with all three commissioners concurring. (R. 407.) 
5. The Industrial Commission made the following 
significant factual determinations: 
(a) Defendants, in good faith, asserted the defense 
that the alleged event did not constitute a compensable 
"accident." (R. 339.) 
(b) Wilburn clearly contemplated asserting a claim 
for permanent total disability several months before he 
executed the Agreement. (R. 341.) 
(c) The parties clearly understood that the trade-off 
contemplated by the Agreement included a relinquishment of 
Wilburn's claim for permanent total disability. (R. 341.) 
(d) The Parties stipulated in the Agreement itself 
that there was a bona fide issue as to the compensability of 
the applicant's claim at the time of the Agreement. (R. 38.) 
(e) The Agreement was approved by the Industrial 
Commission's legal counsel. (R. 40.) 
(f) Settlement of industrial claims is usually a 
desirable objective from a policy standpoint. (R. 373.) 
(g) Wilburn was advised to and did discuss his claim 
with an attorney prior to signing the Agreement. (R. 373.) 
(h) Wilburn discussed the Agreement with the 
Commission's legal counsel who approved the settlement after 
discussing all of its ramifications with Wilburn. (R. 373.) 
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(i) Wilburn gave long and serious consideration to 
execution of the Agreement, which was not prepared on the spur 
of the moment and signed hastily. (R. 373.) 
(j) Wilburn understood the possibility of losing 
medical benefits if he were to lose his claim on the issue of 
n
no accident." (R. 373.) 
(k) A settlement agreement such as that entered into 
by Wilburn is valid under Utah law when an issue concerning the 
compensability of the claim is at issue. (R. 372.) 
(1) To invalidate Wilburn's Agreement would seriously 
undermine the entire settlement process, rendering such process 
so uncertain and unpredictable as to seldom be worthy of 
serious consideration. (R. 374.) 
6. The Commission affirmed the Order of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge on September 9, 1986. On October 7, 1986, 
Wilburn filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this Court, 
which was remanded to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
7. On review, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Industrial Commission Order, holding that (1) Wilburn released 
his claim for permanent total disability benefits upon signing 
the Settlement Agreement; and (2) that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 
(1974) "is no bar to enforceability of the agreement." Wilburn 
v. Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah App. 
1988). The instant Petition for Writ of Certiorari followed. 
C. Statement Of Facts: 
1. On or about April 14, 1980, Wilburn, while working for 
Interstate Electric lifted a small portable generator from the 
floor to his workbench. This activity was neither unusual nor 
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unexpected, but rather, was a routine work function performed 
on a regular basis. (R. 84-85.) 
2. Mr. Wilburn indicated that he did not feel pain in his 
back until five to ten minutes after the described lifting. 
(R. 350-351.) 
3. Wilburn consulted Dr. Gene Smith the following day 
concerning low back pains. Dr. Smith examined Wilburn and 
released him to his regular work within a few days. Wilburn 
took three days off work, underwent physical therapy for two to 
three weeks and then continued to work for over a year without 
additional medical treatment. (R. 1, 59-60, 65, 297.) 
4. On February 2, 1981, Dr. Wallace Hess examined Wilburn 
to determine a disability rating which was found to be a 5% 
permanent partial disability from the claimed work injury plus 
a 15% permanent partial disability due to a pre-existing low 
back condition. (R. 177-180.) Based upon this rating, Wilburn 
received permanent partial disability of 20% benefits, with the 
employer and the Second Injury Fund paying their pro-rata 
shares. (R. 102.) 
5. After April, 1980, Wilburn did not receive any 
additional medical treatment for his low back injury until 
August 18, 1981, when he saw Dr. Gordon Affleck. Wilburn was 
laid off work on July 31, 1981. (R. 11, 65-66, 297.) Dr. 
Affleck placed Wilburn on temporary total disability which was 
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paid by the employer from August, 1981 until September 30, 
1983. (R. 298-300.) 
6. On June 20, 1983, Dr. Hess re-examined Wilburn, noting 
a degeneration of Wilburn's arthritic condition, especially as 
it affected his neck and ankles, a condition unrelated to the 
industrial injury. Dr. Hess determined that the permanent 
partial disability was a combined total of 36% with 10% 
assigned to the claimed industrial injury, 15% assigned to 
pre-existing arthritis in the low back, and 15% assigned to a 
non-industrial cervical spine condition. (R. 181-189.) 
7. Sometime in late 1983, Wilburn consulted with 
Administrative Law Judge Jan Moffitt at the Industrial 
Commission, who advised him to make a claim for permanent total 
disability. She referred Mr. Wilburn to Attorney Robert 
Shaughnessy, with whom he then consulted. (R. 122-123, 322.) 
8. By report dated February 1, 1984, Dr. Affleck stated: 
"Mr. Wilburn is not capable of any significant employment, 
especially in the area that he has any training or capability 
in." (R. 248.) Thereafter, Wilburn contacted National Union 
Fire Insurance Company ("National Union"), the workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, claiming additional continuing 
disability compensation, and was then referred by the carrier 
to its attorney, Stuart L. Poelman, who met with Wilburn on 
February 24, 1984. (R. 31.) 
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9. While meeting with Wilburn, Mr. Poelman explained that 
the employer and its insurance carrier could raise several 
defenses to Wilburn's claim for Permanent disability, including 
a defense that the events of April 14, 1980, as described by 
Wilburn in his statement, did not constitute an industrial 
"accident" under the then existing legal interpretation of that 
concept. Wilburn understood from the discussion that if the 
employer and its insurance carrier were successful in asserting 
such defense, he would lose his claim for all additional 
compensation, including future medical expenses. On April 26, 
1984, Wilburn talked again with Mr. Poelman, at which time 
Wilburn noted his assertion of a claim for permanent total 
disability and a discussion was had concerning the effect of 
defendants' "no accident" defense. Wilburn was told to seek 
the advice of other counsel. Wilburn suggested, and 
Mr. Poelman concurred, that Wilburn should confer with Judge 
Jan Moffitt or Judge Tim Allen at the Industrial Commission. 
Settlement alternatives were discussed, and Wilburn offered to 
settle for an additional 10% permanent partial disability. 
(R. 129-130, 322-323.) Thereafter, the parties reached a 
verbal agreement and Mr. Poelman prepared a Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") which was sent to Wilburn on 
May 31, 1984. (R. 35, 115.) 
10. In June, 1984, Wilburn consulted with Attorney Shaun 
Howell, legal counsel for the Industrial Commission, and asked 
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her for her advice concerning the Agreement. (R. 112, 
117-119.) From that consultation, Wilburn understood the risk 
he might take by pursuing his claim to a hearing. (R. 117.) 
Attorney Howell met with Wilburn on various occasions: first 
when he brought in an application seeking a continuation of 
total disability benefits and indicated that he was going to 
make a claim for permanent total disability; second, when he 
delivered some medical records to Ms. Howell for her review; 
and finally when he brought in a copy of the written Settlement 
Agreement for review. (R. 134-138.) 
11. Attorney Howell testified at the hearing before the 
Industrial Commission that during the discussions it was clear 
that Wilburn was asserting a claim for permanent total 
disability, that Wilburn knew of the defenses which had been 
explained to him by Mr. Poelman, and that Ms. Howell discussed 
those defenses with Mr. Wilburn, including the "no accident" 
defense which, if successful, would bar him from entitlement to 
future medical expenses. (R. 113-114, 141, 145.) 
12. After considering the initial Agreement, Wilburn asked 
for payment of an additional $1,590.00 for temporary total 
disability for the period of September 30, 1983 to November 22, 
1983. Defendants agreed and the Agreement was then revised and 
sent to Wilburn for signature. Wilburn read the Agreement, 
asked Judge Moffitt about it, and signed it. (R. 115, 144.) 
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The Settlement Agreement was then sent to the Industrial Com-
mission on November 1, 1984, and was approved by the Commission 
through its legal counsel, Shaun Howell, on November 28, 1984. 
(R. 36, 40.) Defendants made payment to Wilburn as specified 
by the Agreement. (R. 115-116.) 
12. Wilburn entered into the Agreement when he was age 63 
and had not worked for over three years. (R. 119.) Wilburn 
was then on total disability under Social Security and was 
claiming that he could not work. (R. 93, 119.) At the time 
the Agreement was entered, defendants understood that the 
Agreement compromised and settled Wilburn's claim for permanent 
total disability. (R. 151.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wilburn's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is ill founded 
for at least three significant reasons. First, review by writ 
of certiorari is not appropriate in the instant case because 
Wilburn fails to satisfy any justification that this court 
considers in granting such a writ. Second, Wilburn improperly 
urges this Court to reevaluate Industrial Commission factual 
determinations. Finally, Wilburn mistakes the standard of 
review applied in the Wilburn decision, confusing affirmance of 
the Commission's Order which was based on well supported 




WILBURN'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
SHOULD BE DENIED. 
In his Petition, Wilburn seeks review of various Industrial 
Commission factual determinations, including whether (1) defen-
dants raised the "no accident" defense in good faith; (2) it 
was arbitrary or capricious to uphold the parties' Settlement 
Agreement; and (3) the Parol Evidence Rule was properly 
applied. Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
requires that there be some "special and important reasons" for 
granting a petition for writ of certiorari.1 As set forth in 
detail below, re-evaluation of factual determinations is not 
considered sufficient justification for granting such a writ. 
••-The pertinent portion of Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, provides that: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following . . . indicate the character 
of reasons that will be considered: . . . (2) When a 
panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of this Court; . . . (4) When the 
Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by this Court. (Emphasis 
added.) Review of Judgments, Orders, and Decrees of 
Court of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38-39. (May 4, 
1987). 
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In interpreting the strict standard for granting a petition 
for writ of certiorari, this Court noted that even where some 
special and important reason has been demonstrated, "certiorari 
is [still] a discretionary writ." Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 
39, 42 (Utah 1981). Indeed, "discretion must be used sparingly 
so as not to undermine . . . limits on the time and manner of 
appellate review." Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42. 
The function of the Supreme Court in this posture is to 
review Court of Appeals decisions only where substantial issues 
of law exist or serious error has occurred. See Mast v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138 
(1984). Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
the Oregon Supreme Court stated that: 
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer 
to afford every losing litigant a forum to review 
errors said to have been committed at trial or in 
an administrative hearing. That function is now 
placed in the Court of Appeals. Similarly, a par-
ty asserting that the Court of Appeals, in turn, 
has erred cannot for that reason alone expect 
further review in this Court. The process must 
stop somewhere, and for most purposes this is at 
the first level of appeal. 
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc., 
584 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Or. 1978). 
Much like this Court, Oregon requires a petitioner to 
"present concrete reasons why the importance of an issue 
transcends the importance of the case to the litigants." Id. 
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at 1373. Wilburn's petition in the instant case does not 
encompass any legal issue which might "transcend the importance 
of the case to the litigants", nor does it present any "special 
and important reasons" for further review2. See also n.l, 
supra. The issues arising out of the instant case are better 
characterized as factual issues not likely to be repeated, and 
which are susceptible to clarification and amendment in the 
Industrial Commission. See 1000 Friends, 584 P.2d at 1373 and 
Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25-26. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974) Is No Bar To 
Enforceability Of The Settlement Agreement Because 
Sufficient Evidence Supports The Commission's Finding 
That The Parties Had A Good Faith Dispute As To The 
Compensability Of Wilburn's Claim. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-90 "is no bar to enforceability of the agreement." 
Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. In holding the Agreement to 
be enforceable, the Court of Appeals emphasized that any 
"compassion for the Applicant does not justify the erosion of a 
principle and policy pertaining to compensation agreements 
generally." Ld. 
2
 Wilburn does not contend that this petition is based on any 
of the character of reasons considered under Rule 43, Utah 
Supreme Court Rules except for the allegation that it was 
arbitrary and capricious to uphold the Settlement Agreement. 
Under such circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court counseled 
that "it would be the better part of wisdom to abandon the 
petition for review." 1000 Friends, 584 P.2d at 1373. 
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In this regard, the Court of Appeals concluded that: 
[W]e agree with the Administrative Law Judge that this 
determination [a subsequent finding of compensability] 
cannot "supplant the judgment of those who earlier, in 
good faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful com-
pensability." Since there is sufficient evidence to 
support the Judge's finding that the parties had a 
good faith dispute as to the compensability of the 
claim, we defer to that determination. 
Wilburn attempts to persuade this Court that application of 
an objective standard of review to the facts of the instant 
case would result in a finding that assertion of a "no acci-
dent" defense was not in good faith. However, Wilburn ignores 
two important facts: First, this Court, and the Court of 
Appeals are restricted in their review of Industrial Commission 
factual conclusions. McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial 
Commission, 598 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1979). Second, this Court 
ngive[s] maximum deference to the basic facts determined by the 
agency, which will be sustained if there is evidence of any 
substance that can be reasonably regarded as supporting the 
determination made." Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 
403, 405 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial 
Commission, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah 1987)). 
In the instant case the Court of Appeals properly gave 
deference to the Industrial Commission's factual determina-
tions. Moreover, the Industrial Commission's approval of the 
Settlement Agreement was not arbitrary or capricious, 
especially where: 
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Interstate's argument about the "compensability" of 
Wilburn's claim was not altogether implausible given 
the state of flux surrounding the definition of 
"accident" at the time plaintiff's claim was filed. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. 
B. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Decide An Important 
Question Of State Law, As Yet Undecided By This Court 
Or In Conflict With A Decision Of This Court. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with this 
Court's holdings in Brigham Young University v. Industrial 
Commission, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889 (1929); and Barber Asphalt 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 
(1943) (holding that settlements are appropriate when the 
compensable nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the 
worker's right to recover is doubtful). 
Petitioner mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals' decla-
ration that "it would have no difficulty in finding the 
applicant's claim compensable." The issue is not whether the 
judge or Court of Appeals believed the applicant had suffered a 
compensable accident. The real issue is "a matter of what the 
parties believed and acted upon ..." Ld. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals only reviewed the pro-
priety of the Industrial Commission's factual determination 
that: 
The applicant clearly contemplated asserting a 
claim for permanent total disability several months 
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before he executed the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement. There is no evidence of a "subsequent 
change of condition or a new development not 
contemplated at the time of the release or settlement 
agreement." The stated basis for executing the 
agreement was to avoid the necessity of further 
litigating the "no accident" issue and, in doing so, 
assuring the applicant of a continuation of his 
medical benefits and some additional compensation. 
There is no express provision that the agreement was a 
tradeoff with respect to the applicant's potential 
claim for permanent total disability, even though this 
clearly was the understanding of the parties. 
In Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did discuss 
his claim with an attorney, but at the time he signed 
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he was not 
represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the Commis-
sion's Legal Counsel, who approved the Settlement 
after discussing all of its ramifications with the 
Applicant. Based upon the testimony of the Commis-
sion's former legal counsel who approved this 
particular Agreement, and based upon the Applicant's 
own testimony, there can be little doubt that the 
Applicant gave long and serious consideration to the 
execution of the Agreement. This was not an Agreement 
that was prepared on the spur of the moment and signed 
hastily. It was, in fact, prepared weeks, if not 
months, before it was actually executed. By his own 
admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement 
was signed, was extremely concerned about ensuring a 
continuation of his medical benefits which were 
assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement. If not, there is no doubt 
that the Applicant understood the possibility of 
losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim on 
the issue of "no accident." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 373.) 
Based on these factual determinations, the Court of Appeals 
properly concluded that the Commission's findings were consis-
tent with existing Utah law and should not be displaced. 
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POINT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WILL NOT BE GRANTED FOR 
AN APPEAL WHICH IS BASED ON A FACTUAL 
DISPUTE. 
One of the central functions of the writ of certiorari is 
"to determine whether the inferior court exceeded its jurisdic-
tion." State v. McAllister, 708 P.2d 239 (Mont. 1985). The 
writ of certiorari must be preserved for issues of such great 
legal importance that review is necessary. The Industrial 
Commission's sufficiently supported factual determinations are 
not proper subjects of further appellate review because: 
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary and capricious" 
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one 
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981). 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals determined that 
"[a]lthough the evidence was in conflict, ample evidence 
supports the judge's findings ..." Under these circum-
stances, further review would only be duplicative, and 
unnecessary. 
The major contentions in Wilburn's petition are that, as a 
factual matter: (1) the compensability of Wilburn's claim was 
not disputed; (2) he did not settle his claims for permanent 
total disability benefits; and (2) the Commission and Court of 
Appeals misapplied the parol evidence rule. In making 
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these arguments, Wilburn ignores the function of this Court 
when reviewing Industrial Commission factual determinations. 
This Court has consistently held that deference must be 
given to fact finders especially where, as here, the Legisla-
ture has comprehensively delegated responsibility over a 
particular subject to a specialized administrative agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1987). See, e.g., Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Serv. Commission, 658 P.2d 
601, 608-10 (Utah 1983); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 
28 Utah 2d 14, 16, 497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972). 
Wilburn's argument that Section 35-1-90 makes the 
Settlement Agreement invalid is misplaced for two reasons. 
First, Wilburn must acknowledge that settlements are appro-
priate when compensability is disputed. See Brigham Young, 
supra. Second, the Commission concluded, as a factual matter, 
that "Interstate's argument about the 'compensability of 
Wilburn's claim was not altogether implausible . . .' since 
there is sufficient evidence to support the judge's finding 
that the parties had a good faith dispute." Wilburn, 74 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 25, n.3 (R. 38.) Because this Court gives 
deference to the Commission's factual findings, no additional 
review is necessary. Review of Wilburn's claim that he did not 
intend to settle his claim for permanent total disability is 
not necessary for the same reason. (R. 341.) 
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Wilburn's claim that the Commission and Court of Appeals 
improperly applied the parol evidence rule is likewise flawed 
for two reasons. First, although interpretation of contract is 
generally a question of law, where as here, the contract is 
ambiguous, "the process of resolving ambiguities . . . 
require[s] the consideration of evidence, and conflicts in 
evidence will need to be resolved by the trier of fact." 
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 658 P.2d 
1199, 1201 (Utah 1983). See also Overson v. U.S.F-&G., 587 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). Second, because conflicting evi-
dence was introduced to clarify contractual ambiguities, the 
Commission interpreted the contract, through a factual inquiry 
and determination. On review, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "[allthough the evidence was in conflict, ample evidence 
supports the judge's findings. ..." Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 24. Once again the Court of Appeals properly deferred 
to the Commission's factual determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether the Industrial Commission 
properly approved Wilburn's Settlement Agreement is a factual 
matter which must be ultimately decided by the Industrial 
Commission. Because each case is unique, the Industrial 
Commission must exercise its discretion in making such 
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factually governed decisions. In the instant case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the Industrial Commission based their 
decisions that "the agreement was a validly executed settlement 
of a disputed claim" on ample supporting evidence. 
Thus, the petition fails to demonstrate any legal decision 
by the Court of Appeals which either creates new law, conflicts 
with current law, or otherwise necessitates a decision by this 
Court, For these reasons, Wilburn's petition should be denied. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
"W^cv^ t— 
Stuart L. Poeiman 
Larry R. Laycock 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Interstate Electric 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of April, 1988, I 
caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendants/Respondents Interstate Electric and National Union 
Fire Insurance Company to be mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to the following parties of record: 
Michael E, Dyer 
Stephanie A. Mallory 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
